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REPRESENTATION AND ELECTION:
THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES
IN RETROSPECT
William P. Irwin*
HETHER constitutional historians of a later generation will
consider the reapportionment cases of 1962-1964 to be as
important as several contemporary scholars have suggested1 is an
open question. Not many Supreme Court decisions, of course, are
rewarded with such an outpouring of comment-both favorable and
critical-in the journals of law and political science, in the popular
press, and along the communications networks of concerned. interest
groups. The very novelty of a reinterpretation of the "political
question" doctrine,2 especially as it related to the sensitive matters
of legislative composition and behavior, was bound to excite wide
and varied response. But one test of the importance of a judicial
decision must be its long-range influence on the constitutional
system, and this may or may not be in accord with first speculations.
There are sound reasons to question not simply whether the political
impact of the reapportionment decisions will be as momentous as has
been proposed, but also whether the seeming judicial novelty of the
cases will remain as the actual political ramifications of the decisions
are better understood.
In general, both in the two-year interval between Baker v. Carr8
and Reynolds v. Sims4 and in the period following the reapportionment decisions of June 1964,5 discussion of the issue among scholars
and publicists has tended to center upon four problems of varying

W

• Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. B.A. 1947, Hiram
College; M.A. 1950, Western Reserve University; Ph.D. 1955, University of California
at Berkeley.-Ed.
1. Professor McKay stated, for example, that Baker v. Carr is one of "the two most
important cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in the twentieth
century." Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection,
61 MrcH. L. REv. 645 (1963). Chief Justice Warren himself has assessed Baker v. Carr
as the most important decision of the Warren Court. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1968, at 1,
col. 8,
2. See generally Carrington, Political Questions: The Judicial Check on the Executive, 42 VA. L. REv. 175 (1956).
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
5. The cases decided with full opinions after oral argument were the Colorado
case, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); the Delaware case,
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); the Virginia case, Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678
(1964); the Maryland case, Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377
U.S. 656 (1964); the New York case, WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964), and
the Alaballla case, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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scope and precision: (1) the jurisdiction of the federal courts to pass
upon aspects of state legislative apportionment; (2) the justiciability
of the same matter; (3) the substantive merits of the several cases;
and, (4) the implications of the decisions for democratic theory and
practice. No attempt is made here to reopen the argument about
federal jurisdiction; that question is no longer at issue. The matter
of justiciability, now seemingly quite settled, is broached only indirectly in relating the doctrine of "political questions" to the theory
and process of political representation. Thus, it is to the third and
fourth of these general questions-to the merits of the reapportionment cases and their likely influence on representation in the American political system-that the following remarks are primarily addressed.

I.

THE RESPONSE TO THE CASES

Despite the mixed legal interpretations and sometimes sharply
conflicting political reactions evoked by the leading reapportionment decisions, it is evident that one or more of three related assumptions unq.erlay most of the commentaries, either explicitly or
implicitly. These assumptions, which are fundamentally political
but have direct implications for the law, are (1) that electoral procedures are the sole, or at least the controlling, measure of representation in legislative assemblies; (2) that acceptance of an unqualified
equal-populations standard of legislative apportionment will (for
better or worse) limit or even preclude the representation of discrete
interests in legislatures; and, (3) that, by adopting an equal-populations standard (or, by inference, any constitutional standard) of apportionment, the Supreme Court, justifiably or unjustifiably,
undertook the task of constructing legislative, deliberative assemblies. 6 The fact that the first two of these assumptions have been
cherished in bipartisan fashion by both friends and critics of the
reapportionment decisions is more than a matter of passing interest;
it is an indication of the failure of many of the parties to the reapportionment controversy, including the Supreme Court, to relate
the constitutional issue to the political process. Thus debate has almost invariably centered, not upon the relevant empirical question
of whether enforcement of the "one man-one vote" principle would
have any impact on the process of legislative representation, butassuming that enforcement must have some impact-upon its constitutional propriety.
6. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72

YALE

L.J. 39, 41 (1964).
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The identification of the electoral system, particularly the manner of apportioning electoral constituencies, as the mechanism that
controls political representation is rarely explicit, but it occurs so
frequently as to make the idea seem a truism to the casual reader of
the recent history and law of legislative reform in the United States.
It appeared in characteristic form in the Supreme Court dictum that
"the fundamental principle of representative government in this
country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people," 7
as well as in a widely held interpretation of the Court's majority
opinions in the 1964 reapportionment decisions to mean that "representation of all the people is the only permissible objective of an
apportionment system." 8 It was also evident in the statement that
the "basic issue of these [reapportionment] cases is what kind of
representation processes and institutions are required to assure a
government that rests upon the will of the people," 9 and again in the
declaration that "fair representation is the ultimate goal" that the
Supreme Court must seek to achieve. 10 In one form or another,
the assumption that representation is defined by, if not indeed
synonymous with, the electoral device of legislative apportionment
animated the analysis of the reapportionment decisions in numerous
articles published both before and immediately after the Reynolds
decision in 1964.11 "\,,Vhether this assumption is correct is a question
which cuts to the heart of the theory of representation and is decisive for bringing the reapportionment cases into correct perspective.
The second assumption-that the equal-populations standard of
legislative apportionment must restrain, perhaps even bar, the representation of discrete interest groups in lawmaking bodies-appeared almost as frequently as the first, and often as a quite explicit
assertion. This second assumption evidently springs from the first,
7. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964).
8. R. HANSON, THE PourICAL THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 112 (1966).
9. Kauper, Some Comments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REv. 243,
248 (1964).
10. Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209, 210 (1964).
11. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One
Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 1 (1964); Bickel, supra note 6; Dixon, supra note 10; Israel,

On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v.
Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 107 (1962); Kauper, supra note 9; Kurland, The Supreme Court,
1963 Term-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government", 78 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964); Lucas, Legislative
Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61
MICH, L. REV. 711 (1963); Mccloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword: The
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 55 (1962); Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How To
"Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72 YALE L.J. 23 (1962).
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that apportionment and representation are congruent; it proceeds to
the logical inference that the representation of types and intensities
of interest must occur in direct relation to the apportionment of
quantities of people or votes in the electoral system. Ergo, the
brief concludes, legislative apportionment according to an equalpopulations standard operating on the principle of "one manone vote-one value" must preclude the possibility that interests will
be represented in legislative assemblies except according to their
popular numerical weight. This argument was expressed with elemental clarity in the statement that apportionment based on the
single standard of equal populations "will end centuries of experimentation with the design of democratic institutions which will
accommodate within the same units of government a wide variety of
interest groups." 12
The bipartisan appeal of the argument was surprisingly wide.
Professor Auerbach, for example, was surely correct in observing in
1964 that much of the immediate opposition to the Baker and
Reynolds cases resulted from the belief that interests of one sort or
another are proper objects of legislative representation, and that
apportionment schemes should therefore be devised to accommodate
them.18 He might also have observed, however, that most of the
advocates of apportionment reform in the United States, including
some of those who welcomed the reapportionment decisions, relied
on precisely the same implicit assumption that equality of the vote
will somehow inhibit inequality of representation. The assumed
competence of the electoral system to control the legislative representation of interests is not simply a property of the detractors of
the reapportionment cases, but has been part of the stock in trade of
the apportionment reform movement throughout its history. It is
fundamentally the belief expressed by Justice Frankfurter in his
dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, 14 but also the grounds upon
which Professor Auerbach himself chided the dissenters in the 1964
cases for appealing to the representation of interests.115
The final assumption, that adoption of a single equal-populations
standard of legislative apportionment thrust the federal judiciary
12. Lucas, supra note 11, at 804. The same argument was conveyed somewhat more
indirectly in the observation that "the principle of equality of individual representation
can be only a partiai guide to solution of the apportionment problem," Bickel, supra
note 6, at 41, as well as in the judgment that the principle "may provide an insufficient
standard of faimess," Sindler, supra note 11, at 24-25.
13. Auerbach, supra note 11, at 30-39.
14. 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962),
. .
15. Auerbach, supra note 11, at 30-39.
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headlong into the political thicket of constructing lawmaking
bodies,16 is logically dependent, it is argued below, upon the first
two. Whether the Supreme Court indulged in "judicial prescription"17 in the reapportionment cases has been debated too extensively to require citation. The concern that it might do so was
perhaps expressed most poignantly by Professor McCloskey following the announcement of Baker v. Carr but before the decision in
Reynolds: "[i]t is hard to see how the process of balancing these complexities [of geography, insular minorities, and other interests] could
be reduced to anything resembling 'an exercise of reason' .... It is
equally hard to see how the judicial process thus conceived could
differ from the legislative process ... .''18
But it would not be hard to see, perhaps, if it were found.
that the first two assumptions noted above were without theoretical
relevance or empirical foundation, and that the specter of the "political thicket" dissolved without their support. In fact, there are good
reasons to insist that the processes of election and representationthat is, the individual act of suffrage within some apportionment
framework on the one hand, and the social relationship of representation on the other-are theoretically distinct, politically discontinuous, and constitutionally separable. Every available piece of
evidence in the long history of parliamentary institutions indicates
that the representation of interests and interest groups is a continuing and organic function of legislatures, regardless of electoral
procedures. This in tum suggests that the most likely effect of the reapportionment cases on the legislative process will be simply to create
a "free market" of interest representation, functioning without
statutory bias. The reapportionment decisions must eventually be
related to the process of representation as it occurs in the political
aystem rather than to the curious but longstanding myth of electoral
creation of representation. When this is accomplished, it will be
evident that, far from venturing into the political thicket, the Supreme Court intuitively avoided the difficult questions of legislative
composition and behavior with remarkable prudence.
II.

THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

A major source of confusion throughout the history of debate on
apportionment reform has been the highly ambiguous use of the
16. See generally authorities cited supra note 11.
17, Dixon, supra note 10, at 230.
18. Mc;Closkey, supra note 11, at 73.
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term "representative."19 The formal adoption in the United States
of the title "Representative" in both federal and state constitutions
indicates the conventional identification of an office with its function,
of "my Representative" with "my representative." The confusion
of terms is of no practical consequence, of course, unless it obscures
the rather obvious fact that my Representative, Senator, or Deputy
may not be my representative in any positive or personal sense; he
may, indeed, be actively hostile to my interests or, worse, wholly
unaware of them. One of the greatest achievements of the parliamentary tradition has been general acceptance of the doctrine that
authority adheres to the political office, as constitutionally defined,
and not to its transient occupant. Yet, within the range of accepted
meanings of the verb "to represent," it is clear that an office, as such,
is representative of nothing. Rather, it is the officeholder who is representative, whether that quality is considered as a personal attribute
or as one conferred by the nature of his formal position. Whether
representation occurs as a function of office, as a perceived distribution of characteristics or interests between two or more persons, or
as the product of an operative constitutional system, has never been
resolved to anyone's complete satisfaction in political theory. Moreover, this question was overlooked entirely during the legislative
apportionment controversy of the 1960's. Whatever the answer may
be, political representation is certainly not a simple statutory condition, structured like a crystalline cluster and catalyzed periodically
by an apportionment scheme in a brief moment of election. Instead,
the evidence suggests that representation is a process, continuous,
changing, and influenced by a wide variety of forces of which the
electoral system is only one.
Social representation (including political representation) is a
relationship established by a perceived distribution of characteristics, interests, or values among people, one or more of whom is
authorized to act on behalf of others in the relation. 20 As a perceived
distributive relation, representation necessarily involves two or more
parties, at a minimum the representative and the one represented;
it is thus social by definition and not something that is "possessed"
by individuals, groups, or electorates, whether as a right or a dis19. The most complete brief compendium of the definitions and theories of rep•
resentation in the western tradition is found in Fairlie, The Nature of Political Representation, 34 AM. PoL. Ser. REV. 236, 456 (1940).
20. W. Irwin, Political Representation: An Analytic Model (unpublished paper
delivered at the 1968 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting). See also
C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 264-66 (rev. ed. 1950); H.
GOSNELL, DEMOCRACY: THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM

206-14 (1948),
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pensation. The casual use of such phrases as "right of representation"
and "equal representation" as synonyms for "right to vote" and
"equal suffrage"-a practice in which the courts, too, have indulged
from time to time21-suggests that, beyond the citizen's right of
electoral expression, even beyond his right to equal protection of the
law, he has a comparable right to equal or proportionate attention
from the lawmakers themselves. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that this thought is the essential, though tacit, premise of
much of the literature of the reapportionment controversy, and the
principal wellspring from which many of the champions and opponents of equal voting rights have drawn sustenance.
Attendant to the commonly held idea that political representation is a fixed condition is the further vague belief that it is, or must
be made to be, simple and direct, as the relationship seemingly is
between attorney and client or guardian and ward. In a complex
organization such as the political system, however, representation
tends to be multiple and indirect, while the roles of the parties to
the relationship are frequently interchangeable, ambivalent, or even
conflicting. Indeed, there are good grounds for concluding that the
concept of simple and direct representation could never be more
than a misleading analytic model under any circumstances. Representation does not occur in isolation, but within some social context which is continuously influenced by the norms and constraints
of third parties and the system itself. In the case of the attorney and
his client, to take the evidently simpler case, the relationship is
moderated by law, professional standards, custom, and a variety of
other restrictions introduced by one or the other of the parties or
their associates. Indeed, it is according to some regularized and
commonly accepted system of constraints-in law, politics, religion,
or any other representative relationship-that the function of representation establishes its meaning and finds its justification in the
first place. My representative-my legal counsel or my legislatoris what he is, not because he responds in simple and direct fashion
to my wishes and needs, but because he acts responsibly within some
sort of legalized constitutional framework, that is, a system of norms
and sanctions which we both accept as relevant and legitimate.22
21. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-61 (1964).
22. The removal of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell from the House of Representatives during the 90th Congress illustrates the point with rare clarity. There is
little question that Powell represented, with intense immediacy, the perceived interests
of his constituents in the 18th congressional district of New York. Yet the members of
the House felt obliged (subject, of course, to considerable pressure from their own not
unbiased constituents) to judge whether his behavior was in conformity with the general
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There is a difficulty, however, in settling on the truism that a
representative relationship is subject to systemic influences. The
statement is plain and for most purposes perfectly adequate; no one
would question the assertion that a legislator's proper relation to
his constituents had been corrupted because he accepted a bribe.
But what is to be said of the legislator who casts his vote contrary
to the seeming interests of his constituents because he has received
an appeal from the Governor, his political party, or one of his
legislative colleagues, all of whom are legitimate participants in the
constitutional system but are once removed from "the people back
home" in his district? Certainly there would be little point in arguing in such instances that forces alien to the process of representation
had somehow confounded its proper execution. Rather, it is evident
that such third parties are organically present in any representative
relation and that representation occurs functionally, not just according to the simple mechanics of a contractual device such as an
election system, but as a variable of the whole political process.
The conclusion that emerges from this brief analysis is that the role
of the political representative is fashioned within an exceedingly
complex system, one in which his assessment of himself, of those
whom he represents, and of the various offices and elements of the
system itself are all factors affecting his behavior.23 Needless to say,
the representative's view of any or all of these elements may differ
from those of his constituents, who in turn may differ widely in perceptions among themselves. Some of the more obvious conditions
which shatter the myth of simple and direct representation are noted
at greater length below, although a single example may be cited at
this juncture.
Universally among the world's constitutional democracies, political parties are interposed, in a sense, between electorates and
parliamentary bodies, not just during campaigns for election, but
continuously in artd out of legislative sessions. The party is at times
concretely on hand as a constitutional organ in the representative
process; at other times, or in other systems, it is present as an attitude
or commitment which is exhibited in the behavior of both lawmakers
rules of the game, according to which rules Powell had become a Representative in
the first place.
23. A. DE GRAZIA, ESSAY ON .APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 54
(1963); Eulau, Wahlke, Bachman, &: Ferguson, The Role of the Representative: Some
Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke, 53 AM. PoL. ScI. REV. 742,
749 (1959); D. VERNEY, THE ANALYSIS OF PourICAL 5YSFEMS 144-46 (1959).
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and their constituents. However party functions and powers may
vary among different political systems, the de facto existence of political parties must be acknowledged in any meaningful theory of
representation. It is possible to consider them legitimate representative organs in their own right, as they have become in British practice, moderating and shaping, but presumably not corrupting, the
relation between the people at large and their parliamentary bodies.24
Or parties may be diagnosed as pathological to the body politic, as
has often been done in the American tradition, and precautions
may be taken against them. 25 In neither case, however, can the existence of political parties be reconciled with the simple belief that
political representation can be a direct legislator-constituent bond
pledged by arithmetic electoral ratios. Unhappily, this difficulty and
others of a similar nature have been resolved by most students of
reapportionment in the United States by simply ignoring them.
A further aspect of the theory of representation must be noted,
however, before turning to look at the representative function in
the American political system. Social representation has been defined
as a relation in which one or more persons are authorized to act as
agent or standard of others. I£ the relationship is not a straightforward and fixed condition between electors and elected, under what
circumstances can it be said that the exercise of power in a complex
organization is representative, in the sense of being invested with authority rather than simply arbitrary or dictatorial? As a starting
point, we can postulate that political power is exercised in a representative fashion when all or most of the parties to the relationship
independently perceive the system which prescribes the use of power
to be legitimate. This means, in the first place, that it is not only, or
even necessarily, the particular legislator-constituent ties which satisfy the meaning of representation, but the general political system
which fashions and justifies those same ties. Our quite detailed
knowledge of the numbers, intensities, and configurations of electoral interests26 makes it obvious that a legislator could, at best,
24. D. VERNEY, supra note 23, at 116·20.
25. The view that the "mischief of faction" must be carefully controlled was forcefully expressed by James Madison in the The Federalist No. 23 and has been
echoed over and over again in the Jacksonian, Populist, and Progressive traditions
of popular democracy. For a thorough historical treatment of the view, see A. DE
GRAZIA, PUBUC AND REPUBUC (1951),
26. A. CAMPBELL, P. CoNVERSE, W. MILLER, & 0. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1964);
B. BERELSON, P. UZARSFELD, & w. MCPHEE, VOTING (1954); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); H. ZEIGLER, lNnJmsT GROuPS IN .AMERICAN SOCIETY (1964).
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"mirror the views" 27 or interests of no more than a handful of his
constituents even if he made a conscientious effort to do so. Yet in a
stable constitutional system a legislator's representative qualifications
are called into question only in unusual circumstances, even by persons who voted against him or intensely dislike him. Most of us are
quite prepared, because of our general confidence that the system is
legitimate, to accept as our properly elected representatives persons
who may not be spokesmen for our particular interests.
But the implicit acceptance of the system means still more. It is
not the political system per se, let alone a single element of it such
as an electoral or apportionment arrangement, which supplies authority to the exercise of power; on the contrary, it is a tradition of
legitimacy, a body of "operative ideals," 28 which lends authority to
the system and relevance to its detailed procedures. This means, to
put the matter another way, that formal political representation is
an element in an operative tradition of constitutionalism, in the
tradition of exercise of political power according to accepted standards of consent and restraint.29 If this were not the case, a legislator or other public officer who failed to perform according to the
conflicting expectations of his constituents, or a Ia-wmaking body or
procedure which momentarily became "unbalanced" or fell short of
simulating the apparent character and interests of the electorate,
would simply be without continuing authority. Without the prior
assumption of legitimacy, furthermore, there could be no justification in the representative system for such practices as electoral or
legislative majority decision-making, partisan nominations and elections, partisan organization of legislatures, legislative committee organization, executive leadership in the legislative process, or even, of
course, judicial review, all of which are formally "outside" the
legislator-constituent relationship, and each of which is itself an apportionment device of sorts, structuring, abridging, encouraging, or
restraining the legislative process.
"Every electoral system," Professor Mackenzie has aptly remarked,
27. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, COMMISSION REPORT!
APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES (1962), cited in H. HAMILTON, LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, K.EY TO POWER 121 (1964).
28. A. LINDSAY, THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE 27-51 (1943).
29. The concepts of constitutionalism and representation have been clearly inter•
dependent in their development in the whole period since the twelfth century, as several
studies have shown. M. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT (1936); Beard
&: Lewis, Representative Government in Evolution, 26 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 223 (1932);
Holden, The Imperative Mandate in the Spanish Cortes of the Middle Ages, 24 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 886 (1930).
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"is a sort of confidence trick. [They] only work because we believe
they are going to work."30 As fundamental as elections have become
to the existence of constitutional democracy, they are neither more
nor less than sanctions upon the political system, having the primary
purposes of eliciting popular consent and providing peaceful continuity of leadership. They do not have the function of causing representation or detailing representative behavior. It is not possible to
argue-and it is not, of course, the intent to do so here-that elections bear no political relation to representation; they do so consistently. if quite indirectly, as discussed in the section below. The
point is, rather, that electoral formulas alone cannot generate a sense
of legitimacy; on the contrary, it is the sense of legitimacy, sanctioned
by popular elections, which gives utility and meaning to the concept
of representation. 31

III.

THE PROCESS OF REPRESENTATION

The process of representation in the American political systemindeed, in all political systems, most evidently in the constitutional
democracies-is every bit as intricate as Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan have argued,32 and far more subtle and interesting than
many of the advocates of apportionment reform have led us to believe. Because the reapportionment cases themselves, as well as the
literature of the reapportionment controversy, refer only to legislative elections, it is necessary to begin an analysis of the system by
honoring the nineteenth-century parliamentary fiction that only
lawmaking assemblies can satisfy the requirements of representative
govemment.33 How, then, can the role of one political representative-the legislator-be described to accord with the observed be30. Mackenzie, Representation in Plural Societies, in 2 PoL. STUDIES 54, 69 (1954).
31. S. LIPSET, PoLmCAL MAN 77 (1963): "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the
system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are
the most appropriate ones for the society."
32. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-625 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 266-340 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
33. It is one of the more interesting sidelights of the apportionment controversy that
a reform movement which upheld egalitarian and populist standards of representation
could applaud such decisions as Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), when the decisions were delivered by
an agency of government which is hardly representative by those same standards. It
seems fair to infer that the members of the movement must be willing to assign another
sort of representative function to the courts. This point illustrates the longstanding need to reconsider the whole theory of representation, incorporating
the rather obvious representative functions performed by elected and appointed executives, the courts, clientele-oriented administrative agencies, political parties, and even
such quasi-public organizations as community foundations, voluntary health and welfare agencies, chambers of commerce, and so on.
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havior of lawmaking bodies, and with what appear to be the
principal influences upon that role?
In the most general sense, it is the responsibility of the legislator
to act upon perceived human needs within the framework of certain
constitutional constraints. Implicit in this statement, however1 are
four practical considerations which may not be immediately apparent. In the first place, the representative can act, if he acts at all,
upon only those needs which come to his attention. And many needs
do not come to his attention-not simply £or lack of communication, but because "needsu themselves are a matter of definition and
perception. Second, the representative may perceive human needs
variously in terms of individuals, functional groups, territorial
jurisdictions, or ethical certitudes; but because his perceptions
are rarely recorded publicly, such distinctions are largely moral
and semantic rather than empirical, and th-µs are not subject to
statutory determination. Third, the representative's sensibility to
public needs varies not only according to the numbers of people who
may have been allotted him by apportionment statutes, but also
consonant with tµe clarity and intensity with which such needs are
made known to him, their compatibility one to another, and their
legitimacy as he sees them in his moral or constitutional universe.
Finally, the constraints upon any :representative are multiple and
interrelated, both statutory and political, and extend far beyond
the immediate electoral and legislative machi11-ery with which they
are conventionally associated.
Beyond the logic of the argument, however, the strength of
evi¢1.ence relating to legislative behavior34 leads to a further conclusion, one which has generally been obscured in the theories of
representation and ignored in judicial interpretation. Because the
representative is able to act only upon perceived needs, needs which
in his observation vary by kind, clarity, intensity, and legitimacy, it
follows that in the process of representation (as distinct from the law
of elections), a legislator's constituents are effectively defined by a
?4.

J.

MATTHEWS, SoCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF PoLmCAL D:ECISION-MAKERS (1954);

J.

WAHLKE, W. BACHMAN,&: L. FERGUSON, THE L:EGISLATIVE SYSTEM: ExPLORATIONS IN LEGIS•

LATIVE BEHAVIOR (1962):" Chubb, "(Joing Abp.ut Persecuting Civil Servants": The: Role:
of th(! Irish Parliamentary :fl.epresentative, p Por,.. ~TUDI~ 27~ (1963); Crane, The:
Errand-Running Function of ,4ustrian Legislators, 15 rARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 160
(1962); Dowse, Repr(!sentation, General Elections and Democracy, 15 PARLIAMENTARY
AFFAIRS 331 (1962); Epstein, British M.P.S. and Their Local Parties: The Suez Case:s, 54
AM. PoL. Sci. R.Ev. 374 (1960); Eulau, supra note 23; Kornberg, Perception and Constittfency Influenc~ on Legislative Behavior, 19 WESTERN Pot. Q. 285 (1966); Miller &:
Stokes, Constituency Influence: in Congress, ~7 AM. PoL. Sp. REv. 45 (1963); Wahlke,
Bachman, &: Ferguson, American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure
Groups, 22 J. POL. 203 (1960).
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pattern of behavior in which both participate-by his identification
of certain articulate publics and their reactions to one another.
That the law of elections is a factor in this process is, of course,
perfectly dear, but it functions as only one of a large number
of constraints in the representative's psychological world. There is
no doubt in the legtslator's mind, and certainly no constitutional
barrier to his understanding, that from one day to the next, and
even simultaneously, he may be called upon to act on behalf of a
specified individual, an organized group, a generalized class or category of persons (such as the aged or the poor), a district, state, region,
or nation, and perhaps even some seemingly detached ideal such
as "national honor." Yet any or none of these influences may be
directly related to the apparent interests of "the people back home
in the district." Still he returns to those people periodically, not to
pose the conundrum of whether he has satisfied the dictates of "equal
representation," but to seek their consent to his behavior by asking,
"How am I doing?" This quest for the constituents' general consent
is not illogical, however, since the legislator knows that their behavior is not bounded solely by the territorial and numerical pro•
visions of the election statutes; it is subject to the same range of
indefinite and conflicting constraints as his own.
Therefore, the assumption that any apportionment system-a
necessary yet quite arbitrary device for choosing members of a legislature-can be the dominant, let alone ruling, force upon legislative
behavior is as fundamental a misapprehension of the political process
as it is possible to entertain. It is obvious that apportionment plans
do affect the legislator; they do so, however, not by arithmetically
redistributing his sensibilities toward a jurisdiction or the persons
who reside within it, but by altering his perception of the whole
political system in a way that would be entirely unpredictable if
other major factors were not taken into account simultaneously. Far
from simply reacting to the stimuli of his statutory environment, the
legislator actively engages in the creation of constituencies and constituent interests-identifying, weighing, selecting, and rejecting
them, even imputing the existence of needs and aspirations to people
who cannot speak for themselves. In short, the legislator is affected
by the law, but he is hardly a creature of it; it is his function to make
public policy, rather than to attempt to reflect electoral directives
which, without his prompting, might not even exist in the first
place. It is this consideration-that a government must in some part
lead rather than simply follow-that gives meaning and importance
to elections as the machinery of consent.
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But, apart from the somewhat abstract outline of the role of
the representative, attention should be drawn to some of the more
obvious constraints within the political system (in addition to apportionment) which tend to modify and shape the representative
relationship between electors and elected. Several of these constraints
are embedded in the statutes of election and others are found in the
operating procedures of government, but they all have roughly the
same significance for the representative process as apportionment,
and, in a sense, each functions as a de facto apportionment device. 31l
The most evident of the electoral influences upon representation
are the states' widely varying suffrage provisions for general elections.
Except in areas where Negroes are still effectively disenfranchised, it
is generally conceded that these variations no longer present a serious
problem for state and federal elections in the United States. Yet in
recent years the Supreme Court has entertained questions of discriminatory impairment of suffrage rights by use of the literacy
test, 36 by congressional and assembly district gerrymandering,37 and,
in the reapportionment cases themselves, by the arbitrary use of
place of residence. On purely constitutional grounds, there is no
reason to assume that the federal courts will not be asked in the
future to look more closely at voter registration procedures and perhaps term of residence provisions,38 both of which have been widely
used for patently discriminatory purposes.
At the local level these variations are of even greater significance.
Given the fact that municipalities, school districts, and a variety of
other special election districts are, according to state constitutional
35. Dean Neal notes the effects which legislative districting, special-majority elections,
and the seniority system, among other things, have upon representation, and concludes
that "equality of voting weight is scarcely any guide to reasonableness or fairness of a
State's representative plan. As a standard of performance it is about as adequate an
instrument as would be a ruler for judging a work of sculpture or a metronome a
symphony orchestra." Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 252
(1962). I agree that equality of voting weight is not an adequate measure of representation, but maintain that it is an important constitutional value in itself. The search for
a "reasonable" or "fair" standard of representation, it seems to me, is the very definition of "politics in search of law." See A. DE GRAZIA, supra note 23, for an extensive
catalogue of electoral and legislative procedures which directly bear upon the repre•
sentative relationship.
36. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S.
145 (1965); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
37. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
38. In another context, several cases are now pending before the Supreme Court
which challenge the constitutionality of requiring a minimum period of residency
before an individual may participate in state welfare programs. For a report of the
oral argument of these cases, see 37 U.S.L.W. 3153 (Oct. 29, 1968).
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standards, "instrumentalities created by the State," 39 there is a
Pandora's box of potential litigation on questions of statutory discrimination in suffrage on the basis of property ownership, tax liability, both place and term of residence, literacy, and perhaps other
lesser known standards.40 Indeed, clarification of one of these potential issues is already underway. Although the Supreme Court has thus
far held that the ruling in Reynolds v. Sims is applicable only to
local government bodies "having general governmental powers"41a definition which is by no means clear-it also declared that "singlemember districts of substantially unequal population" for the election of local as well as state governments are in violation of the
equal protection clause.42 The point here is neither to predict nor
to encourage further litigation of this sort, however justified it may
be, but simply to make it clear that state, county, municipal, and
special election districts in the United States are "apportioned," not
just according to the number of people residing in them, but frequently on the basis of citizens' attainments, mobility, and solvency
as well.
Of a similar order, but on a considerably more confused plane, is
the fact that party nomination procedures are an organic part of the
electoral process. The Supreme Court has, of course, recognized that
primary elections may be "an integral part of the election machinery" and thus are subject to the same public regulation as general elections,43 a fact which led Professor Emerson to remark that
the logic of the reapportionment decisions might apply equally to
primary elections.44 But nominating caucuses and conventions are
also integral to the electoral process, and, however remote their procedures may appear to be from the issue of the reapportionment
cases, they probably influence the representative process as significantly as both primary and general elections. Although the mat39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
40. Compare Cipriano v. City of Houma, 286 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1968) (property
tax requirement for voting in a municipal utility revenue bond issue election held
constitutional even though the utility was to be self-financing) with Pierce v.
Village of Ossining, 292 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (property ownership requirement
for voting in a village election to determine whether to change from a mayoral system
to a village manager system of government held unconstitutional).
41. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). The Court earlier ruled that,
because a board of education performs "essentially administrative functions" and is
"not legislative in the classical sense," there is no violation of the equal protection
clause if the board is appointed or indirectly elected. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387
U.S. 105, 110 (1967).
42. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968).
43. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
44. Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 70 (1962).
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ter seems to have little or no judicial relevance, there is no doubt
that participation in any of the several nominating procedures, a
privilege typically limited by law to narrow categories of electors, is
an act-a "vote," if you will-of greater political significance than
that which is guaranteed to the population at large in general elections. Obviously, it is also action which has a direct bearing on the
subsequent outlook and behavior of the elected representative.
A final example of formal electoral constraints upon representation is legislative districting, a matter which has come before the
Supreme Court in several recent cases.45 It is common knowledge,
of course, that legislative districts can be gerrymandered, altering
their socioeconomic and partisan characteristics without substantially
varying the numbers of people within them or distorting their configurations. The relative utility of large and small districts, singlerriember and multiple-member districts, or demographically homogeneous and heterogeneous districts has recently been given some
attention by political scientists, 46 although no thorough assessment
of their impact upon the representative relationship has yet been
made. No great amount of evidence is required, however, to sustain
the assertion that any of these statutory variables, and in particular
the use of multiple-member districts, 47 can affect the representative
behavior of legislative assemblies in much the same way as the numerical apportionment of populations among electoral districts.
Most of the recent discussion in the United States about the techniques of legislative districting has rested upon the assumption that
such electoral engineering or "legal gerrymandering" must be undertaken within the limits impos~d by the doctrine of electoral
equality that the Court elaborated' in the reapportionment cases.
It is worth noting, however, that several combinations of deliberately
biased apportionment and legislative districting plans have been
used for the purpose of increasing the parliamentary representation
of democratic or centrist political parties in a number of European
countries; 48 such schemes have also been pointedly urged for New
45. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965);
Boineau v. Thornton, 379 U.S. 15 (1964).
46. Hamilton, Some Observations in Ohio: Single-Member Districts, Multi-Member
Di$tricts, and the Floating Fraction, in H. HAMILTON, REAPPORTIONING LEGISLATURES 73
(1966); Irwin, Colorado: A Matter of Balance, in M. JEWELL, THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONi-1ENT 64 (1962); Jewell, Criteria Reflected in Recent Apportionments; in H.
HAMILTON, REAPPORTIONING LEGISLATURES 14 (1966).
47. This practice has recently undergone judicial observation. See Lucas v. FortyFourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); cases cited supra note 38.
48. General political instability, __as well as the growing threat of the Communist
Party following World War II, led France, Italy, and Germany, among others, to adopt
electoral systems which encouraged the growth of or inflated the number of legislative
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Zealand49 and tentatively suggested for the United States50 i!S a
means of assuring a legislative majority to the political party which
receives a majority of the popular vote. The introduction of any
such device for the purpose of shifting "some of the emphasis from
representation as a function of election to representation as a function of government," 51 is in one respect precluded in the United
States by the ruling in Reynolds v. Sims; districting to provide
representation in violation of the equal-populations standard is
clearly impermissible. However, the state legislatures are perfectly
aware that there is currently no constitutional barrier, nor is there
likely to be one in the immediate future, against the manipulation
of demographic data in the construction of legislative districts that
satisfy the equal-population principle but still achieve partial modification of the representative process.
Although the informal constraints upon the legislator's conduct
of his office are superficially less evident, they are perhaps of greater
importance to the representative system than those formal limitations
just discussed. The most immediate of these constraints is the legislative assembly itself, containing a number of what might be termed
"internal constituencies." In order to make collegial lawmaking a
practicable undertaking, it has been universally necessary to adopt
extensive rules of procedure which, in a sense, apportion the time
and attentions of the assembly member. More than three-quarters
of a century ago, Woodrow Wilson pointed out that congressional
committees tend to assume the qualities of a whole legislative body
and are frequently dominated by chairmen with undisputed, nearseats held by their democratic and centrist parties. In France, under the Fourth Republic, a scheme of proportional representation was adopted, using a list ballot system
in large multiple-member districts. Seats were allocated on the basis of highest aveniges,
a system which reduces the potential impact of small party concentrations in local
areas. Italy had used a highest-averages proportional representation system for a brief
period between the wars, but returned to a simple list system in 1948. In 1952, after
sharp erosion of the electoral base of the Christian Democratic Party, a new law was
passed which permitted partisan electoral alliances and which provided that any party
or alliance that polled more than 50% of votes cast in the nation at large would be
alloted 65% of national assembly seats. Although Germany has altered its electoral
provisions several times since World ·war II, its basic law of 1953 provides for a
combination of simple plurality elections in constituencies in which half of the
Bundestag members are elected, and a highest-averages proportional representation list
system in a single national constituency, by which means the other half of assembly
members arc chosen. The effect of this system is to reduce not only the size of marginal
parties, but the total number of parties as well. W. MACKENZIE, FREE ELECTIONS 85-89
(1958).
49. Scott, Gerrymandering for Democracy, 7 POL. SCI. ll8 (1955).
50. Sindler, supra note ll.
51. J. HOGAN, Eu:CTION AND REPRESENTATION 183 (1945).
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dictatorial authority. 52 An American lawmaker today is at once a
member of a whole legislature, one of its houses, one or more committees and subcommittees, a party caucus or conference, and perhaps a study commission or two. Each of these organs is an operative
internal constituency which the member "represents" as a matter of
duty, deference, or reciprocity. 53 The general tendency of American
legislators to specialize, becoming experts on agriculture or taxation while deferring to their colleagues on other matters, further
estranges the_m from the innocent effort to provide "equal representation to equal numbers of people." In addition to representing a host
of internal and external constituencies, a legislative body must also
represent itself, not in order to pursue selfish interests, but to preserve its powers, prestige, and traditions, and to deflect and structure
the demands of its external constituents.
Among the external constituencies, finally, are a formidable array
of organized centers of power and authority, both in and out of
government, which bring varying degrees of influence to bear upon
the representative process. The most obvious of these in a presidential
system of government is, of course, the chief executive. The role
of independently elected chief executives has never been properly
considered in the theory of representation, probably because the
major elements of the theory are European in origin, and thus related to the experience of parliamentary systems. The point need
not be pressed, however, that elected chief executives may be looked
upon as representative figures in their own right; it is sufficient to
make the commonplace observation that the President, the governor, and other elected state executives, as well as the mayor or city
manager, are dominant powers in the legislative process, often exacting continuous and detailed representation from friends and foes
alike. In addition, executive departments, departmental bureaus,
and independent regulatory agencies at all levels of government frequently maintain ex parte representative relationships with individual members and committees of legislative bodies. 54 Even the
courts are present in the legislative process, not as active petitioners,
of course, but as a perceived restraining influence-just as they have
been in recent- years, for example, in respect to legislative apportionment.
52. CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 60-84 (1885).
53. Huitt, The Congressional Committee: A Case Study, 48 AM. PoL. Sex. R.Ev. 340

(1954).
54. Getz, Ex Parte Communications: A Study in Legislative Reluctance, 19 WESTERN
POL. Q. 31 (1966).
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Too much has been written on the continuing impact of private
and quasi-governmental interest groups55 on both elections and the
legislative process to require further elaboration here. 56 It is sufficient to indicate that the influence of such groups upon the representative process is probably substantially greater than that of any
electoral device, and that any theory of representation which does
not take them into account is completely inadequate.
IV.

THE LOGIC OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES

Of the three assumptions noted at the outset, the first two, it
seems, can be dismissed as insubstantial. The initial assumption that
the electoral process, perhaps even the apportionment system alone,
is the controlling measure of representation in legislative assemblies
is utterly unfounded. The invention begins with a misconception of
the meaning and function of the process of representation, ignores
the great number of additional constraints upon the relationship
between electors and elected, and, finally, assigns to the electoral
process the impossible task of generating, rather than supporting
and sanctioning, the legitimacy of the system. The second assumption, that adoption of an equal-populations standard of legislative
apportionment will limit or preclude the representation of interests,
is equally without meaning. It rests, it seems, on the same misconception of the representative process as the first assumption-that is,
on the illusion that representation is wholly dependent on the
electoral process and that the terms of the latter can be made to
occupy the legislator's attentions fully, immunizing him from other
influences in the political system. The representation of interests, it
is safe to predict, will go on apace in the legislatures of the United
States, just as it has in every parliamentary body in history, however apportioned. At most, the effect of the constitutional standard
adopted in the reapportionment cases will be to alter slightly the
rules of the legislative game, as indicated below.
But what of the third assumption, that the Supreme Court, by
entertaining the substantive issue of legislative apportionment, initiated a new and drastic attempt to construct lawmaki~g bodies? On
first reckoning, it appears that the matter of legislative apportionment is so meager an element in the complex political process of
representation as to exonerate the Court on the grounds of de mini55. Of course, this category includes political parties, discussed in text accompanying note 43-44 supra.
56. See authorities cited supra notes 26 and 34.
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mus culpability alone. As Professor Pollack has pointed out, the
issue of Negro voting rights, which the Court has steadily clarified
in the thirty-three year period between Nixon v. Herndon 51 and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 58 has in principle a similar, perhaps identical, relevance for the function of representation as that of apportionment. 59 Certainly the composition and perhaps the behavior of
American legislative bodies have been modified by these and other
cases dealing with suffrage rights, 60 yet there is no substantial objection that the courts have tampered with the legislative prerogative
in any of the~.
Still, tµe answer to the question of whether the Supreme Court
has strayed into a politicc1.l thicket must be related to a more fundaJ!len~al consideration than that of the degree of its influence upon
the political process; it must rest upon the argument-which the
Court acted upon but did not clearly enunciate in the reapportionm~nt d~cisions-that the right of an individual to vote, on the one
hap.«;!, and the "righf' of a person or interest to representation, on
the other, belong to essentially different constitutional orders. It is
the latter order, that of representation, which is the substance of
the political process: it is the political thicket. For the Supreme Court
to hc1.ve m.ade any attempt whatever to insure the accommodation
of any int~rest-geographical, economic, ethnic, partisan, or "historical"-in the legislative process would have catapulted it headlong into the continuing political questions, not simply of whether,
but also of which groups are to receive political advantages in the
legisl<1-tiv~ process. Such questions are at the very heart of public
policy determination,
· Yet it is remarkable how frequently the Supreme Court was
either urged, to do precisely this, or reproached for not having done
s9. T9 express the hope immediately after Baker v. Carr that the
S-qprei:µe Court would eventually adopt a standard of "rational
deviations" from the equal-population principle of apportionment
in order to provide "repre~entation according to political subdivisions, geographical regions, or functional divisions in the population"
as a mc1,tter of "reasoned policy," 61 was simply to invite the judiciary
57. 273 U.S. ·535 (1927).
58. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
59. Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81, 83 (1962).
?rofe~or Pollack's remarks are particularly perceptive inasmuch as they preceded the
decisions of 1964.
60. See Harper -y. Virginia :Sd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 543 (1964); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v: Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944).
61. Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future
of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 107, 134 (1962).
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into the political thicket. To propose late in 1962 that the Court
consider both area representation and some means "of assuring
significant legislative representation to the minority party in urban
areas" 62 was to issue the same perilous invitation. Or to maintain
following the 1964 apportionment decisions that the Court had
ignored such considerations as "effective majority rule" and the
permanent underrepresentation of minorities, and that it must in
the future take them into account, 63 was not only to misconstrue
the meaning of the reapportionment cases themselves, but also to
entice the Court into the very political morass which virtually everyone agreed in principle that it should avoid.
There is an enduring democratic appeal, of course, in proposals
which seek to guarantee to electoral or partisan majorities a proportionate influence in legislative assemblies or to apportion the vote
in such a way as to accommodate urban areas or racial minorities,
which have certainly suffered legislative indignities in the past. But
what standard is available to the Supreme Court as a constitutional
test of "rational deviations" from equal suffrage in legislative apportionment? What is the measure of the validity of any particular
claim to legislative attention which may be brought fonvard by a
racial, ethnic, or cultural group, by a political jurisdiction, an industrial association, a fraternal society, or even, as Professor Dowse
asks, 64 by a birdwatchers club?
Among the various "geographic interests" whose virtues have
been debated throughout the history of the apportionment reform
movement, which of them is the most reasonable? What, for example,
is the "rural interest"? Whatever its substance may have been in the
formative years of the Republic, there is little doubt that its meaning
has varied sharply in the United States from one regional economy
to another and from one era to the next; today it is the mixed voices
of urban-based extracting and processing industries, businessmen
in small cities, and the more highly organized and conservative farm
producer groups, all of whom find the wistful memory of our agrarian
past congenial to their present interests. It is probably the case,
moreover, that political overrepresentation of the so-called rural
interest in state legislatures did not generally result from malappottionment, but instead directly caused it. It required political management of a high order, not only to impose unequal apportionment,
62. Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How To "Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72 YALE
23, 29-30 (1962).
63. See Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. R.Ev. 209 (1964).
64. Dowse, supra note 34, at 336.
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as happened in Ohio in 1902 and in Colorado in 1962, but also to
sustain it when it resulted from population shifts, as was the case in
Tennessee and Alabama. There is little likelihood, under the circumstances, that the directive of the reapportionment cases will radically alter the structure of political skills and power that are operative in the state legislatures.
Moral or political considerations aside, there were simply no
available constitutional grounds upon which the Supreme Court
could have responded to the plea of one interest rather than another in the reapportionment cases. Accordingly, there was only one
course available to the Court-a course which took into consideration the fact, evident beyond any shadow of a doubt, that the votes
of some people were not equal in weight to the votes of others under
the apportionment schemes of most of the states, but a course which
also honored the standing injunction against judicial intervention
in "political questions." That course was to act upon the suffrage
question in isolation, asserting once again the constitutional right
of each citizen to participate equally in the electoral process without
reference to whether any citizen or his interest would come to the
subsequent attention of a legislature. And it was precisely this, no
more, that the Supreme Court accomplished in the reapportionment
cases, despite the frequent ambiguity and extravagance of its language.
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court observed: "Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections ...." 65 "[T]he right
to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice," it went on to say, "is
of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise." 66 Thus, as stated in the Court's own words,
the core of the matter is that "the weight of a citizen's vote cannot
be made to depend on where he lives." 67
In Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly 68 this judgment was
elaborated: "[A]n individual's constitutionally protected right to cast
an equally protected vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a
majority of a State's electorate .... A citizen's constitutional rights
65.
66.
67.
68.

377
377
377
377

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 554.
at 555.
at 567.
713 (1964).
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can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people
choose that it be." 69 In summary, the reapportionment cases declared
that the right to vote is "individual and personal" 70 and cannot be
infringed by the act of a majority or impaired by the accident of residence, regardless of whether the purpose of the apportionment
scheme is to achieve a balance of geographic interests, to accommodate sparsely settled areas, to nourish any special group or interest,
to establish easily served electoral districts, or even to honor political
tradition. Only the use of political subdivisions, such as counties,
may for quite practical reasons be admitted as technical deviations
from the equal-populations standard of legislative apportionment.71
Frequently, to be sure, the Supreme Court has lapsed into the
somewhat allegorical language which has colored public debate on
legislative reform for generations-a fact that is not particularly
surprising when it is recalled that the same confusions have been
entertained by those on all sides of the debate. Thus, the Court
resorted to using such phrases as "equal representation" and "the
right of equal representation," sometimes quite categorically, as in
the observation on its earlier opinion in Wesberry v. Sanders72 "that
'our Constitution's plain objective' was that 'of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal ... .' " 73
It was not, of course, by any word or hint "our Constitution's plain
objective" to guarantee equality of representation; in fact, there is
every evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, it was a plain
objective of the Constitution's draftsmen, as Professor McCloskey
has pointed out,74 to found the constitutional system upon the tradition of popular consent, and, with the passage of time, it has become
a further constitutional objective to make the process of consent
universal.
On other occasions the Court indulged in such appealing dicta
as the remark that, "[l]ogically, in a society ostensibly grounded on
representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority
of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State's legisla69. 377 U.S. at 736-37.
70. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
71. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580-81 (1964); Vigneault v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 237 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1968); Recent Development, Reapportionment
-Legislative Bodies-Signaficant Deviation from Standard of Substantial Population
Equality of State Legislative Districts Is Permissible To Provide Representatives for
Two Island Counties, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 587 (1969).
72. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
73. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964).
74. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword: The Reapportionment
Cam, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 55, 71 (1962).
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tQr~. "71i It d9~s s~em re~spnable, to be ~ure, put it bears no necessary
glatiop. to the issue 9f equal suffrage, as Professor Lucas has correctly ~oted. 76 A popul~r i:p.ajority can be guaranteed a legislative
majority, in fact, only by prescribing the character of that majority
(by nµmber, jurisdiction, party, interest, or any combination of such
GOJ1Sjderati<;ni~) arn;l thereafter, by biasing electoral procedures to as~m;~ t4€;! <;lesir(;!d outcome. And once so difficult a task is undertaken,
as several European nations have learned since World War II, there
still can be no guarantee that the interests of that popular majority,
however they may b~ defined, will be represented.
In the final analysis1 a11-d despite its sometimes distracting digressions, the Supreme Court did no more-but certainly no less-in
the reapportion~ent c<1-ses than add a further and remarkably cauti9µs dimension to the almost universally conceded right of each
citiien to vote. While 9nly "qualified" citizens may vote, the Court
held (reserving judgment on remaining suffrage limitations), the
Constitution cannot permit impairment of the vote on the accidental
basis of place of residence. It is difficult to see how Baker v. Carr
could in the future be held to be anything more or less than Professor Black, in l962, insisted that it was: a single, clear holding that
the Gourt had been mistaken in Colegrove v. Green, 77 and that the
complaint was in fact one of "dilution of the plaintiffs' votes." 78 It
is also hard to see how the reapportionment decisions of 1964 could
be c9nstrued by ~ later generation of scholars in any other light than
that which Professor E~erson cast upon them in a remarkable act
of anticipation late in 1962: "The fact that the Court [in Baker v.
Carr] was dealing with the right to vote, a fundamental and special
area, indicates that one sh9uld perhaps not make too much of this
new use of the equal protection clause." 79
Happily, the Court did n9t turn t9 a widely accepted formulatior:i o~ the issu~ as being a problem of 1'£<1-ir representation." 80 Quite
apart from the judgment, stated above, that representation and
suffrag~ are at one(;! distinct concerns of political theory and only
indirectly related in the political process, it would be hard to imagine
an adjective more imprecise and political in nature than "fair." The
Court looked instead to the patently justiciable and quite objective
75. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 565 (1964).
76. Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The Mean·
ing of Baker v. Carr, 61 M1cH. L. REY. 711, 772 (1963).
77. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
78. Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrr,JVe v.
Green, 72 Y...µ.E L.J. 13.
79. Emerson, supra note 44, at 65.
80. E.g., Dixon, supra note 63, at 210.
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constitutional issue of equal suffrage, establishing an additional
precedent in cases which should be interpreted-indeed, will in time
be interpreted-as voting rights cases having little or no relevance
to the legislative process.
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES

Two further questions should be touched upon briefly. What
will be the likely influence of the reapportionment decisions on
legislative behavior after the present period of reapportionment and
redistricting is substantially complete? And, what is the logical extension of these cases for possible future judicial determination?
To the extent that apportionment systems act as constraints on
the process of representation (an extent minimized above), the
withdrawal of all statutory bias in favor of any political group or
interest will tend to foster a "free market" of representation in
which individuals, groups, geographical areas, and other interests
can command legislative attention on a legally random basis. Whether
such an outcome is desirable is a question that is likely to be debated
at length as it becomes clear that the reapportionment cases will have
little or no bearing on the legislative response to any particular
political issue such as the social and economic equality of Negroes
· or the elimination of poverty. The effect of such a representative
free market, as in all free markets, will be to give greatest advantage
to those who possess the greatest political skills and resources-that
is, to the established, the prosperous, and the least scrupulous.81 It
will provide roughly the same political advantage as the previous
legislative market provided to any group or coalition of interests
which possessed the power to exact favored legislative treatment,
including, it should be noted, the coalition that supported or imposed inequality of the vote in the first place.
Finally, contrary to the suggestion that the federal courts must
now attend to such aims as "effective majority rule" or the representation of minorities,82 the logic of the reapportionment cases
seems to be otherwise. The likelihood is, in fact, that the Supreme
Court has limited its future ability to weigh such political questions, not so much as a result of its reformulation of the doctrine
of political questions, but because of its defense of a purely "individual and personal" standard of invidious discrimination in suffrage provisions. The logical extension of the cases, then, appears
81. Dowse, supra note 34, at 332.
82. E.g., Dixon, supra note 63.
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to be toward a further clarification of the meaning of the right
to vote as that question may arise with respect to primary elections,
elections in local jurisdictions such as counties and municipalities,
or alleged discrimination in voting on the basis of term-of-residence
standards, property requirements, or, possibly, voter registration procedures. But how many of these electoral questions will be examined
in the courts in the future is still another political question.

